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ABSTRACT 
This study tries to analyze the effect of corporate governance practices, ownership, and firm 
size on the amount of earnings management. It was conducted in the companies listed in In-
donesia Stock Exchange. Ownership structure can be divided into institutional ownership 
and family ownership, firm size which were measured by market capitalization. The corpo-
rate governance practices were measured using three variables (quality audit, the proportion 
of independent board, and the existence of audit committee). Multiple-regression was em-
ployed for analysis with the empirical data from 117 samples of manufacturing companies 
listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. It was found that company size and family ownership 
have a significant influence on the amount of earnings management. The larger the company, 
the smaller management is on average earnings and earnings management in the firms with 
high family ownership. Those that are not a corporate conglomerate are higher than average 
earnings in the management of other companies. The practice of corporate governance and 
institutional ownership variable did not have significant effect on the amount of profit made 
by company management.  
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PRAKTEK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN 
SAHAM, DAN UKURAN PERUSAHAAN PADA PENGELOLAAN LABA 
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh praktik corporate governnance, ke-
pemilikan, dan ukuran perusahaan terhadap jumlah earning management. Penelitan ini dila-
kukan di perusahaan yang terdaftar pada Bursa Efek Indonesia. Struktur kepemilikan bisa 
dibagi menjadi kepemilikan institusi dan keluarga; ukuran perusahaan diukur dengan 3 
variabel yaitu kualitas audit, proporsi dewan direksi independen, dan keberadaan komite 
audit. Multiple regresi digunakan untuk menganalisis data yang terdiri dari 117 perusahaan 
manufaktur yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Ditemukan bahwa ukuran perusahaan 
dan kepemilikan keluarga memiliki pengaruh signifikan terhadap jumlah earning manage-
ment. Semakin besar perusahaan, semakin kecil earning management pada earnings rata-
rata dan earning management di perusahaan yang nilai rata-ratanya lebih tinggi daripada 
kepemilikan keluarga. Perusahaan yang bukan konglomerat justru lebih tinggi earning man-
agementnya. Praktik penerapan corporate governance dan kepemilikan perusahaan tidak 
berpengaruh secara signifikan terhadap earning management.  
 
Kata Kunci: corporate governance, struktur kepemilikan, ukuran perusahaan, dan penge-
lolaan laba. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is stated that a financial statement is a 
means of communicating financial informa-
tion to parties outside the corporation. This 
financial statement is expected to provide 
information to investors and creditors for 
making decisions related to investment 
funds. In preparing financial statements, the 
accrual basis should be chosen because it is 
more rational and fair in reflecting the com-
pany's financial condition in real terms. 
However, using the accrual basis may pro-
vide more flexibility for the management in 
choosing the method of accounting so that 
they will not deviate from the rules of the 
Financial Accounting Standards.  
In general, the choice of accounting 
methods that are deliberately selected by 
management for specific purposes is known 
as earnings management. When the man-
agement did not succeed in attaining the tar-
get profit specified, the management will 
take advantage of the flexibility allowed by 
the accounting standards in preparing their 
financial statement. This is done for modify-
ing the reported earnings. Management 
should be motivated to show good perform-
ance in generating value or the maximum 
benefit for the company. By doing so, they 
management can select and apply account-
ing methods that can provide a better return. 
The existence of information asymmetry 
allows the management to create earnings 
management. Research by Richardson 
(1998) showed a positive relationship be-
tween information asymmetry and earnings 
management. 
One of measurements for corporate per-
formance is often used as a basis for deci-
sion making. Such a measurement is the 
company's profit generated (Subramanyam, 
1996), where profit is measured by the ac-
crual basis. Accrued profit is considered as a 
better measurement because the corporate 
databases must address satisfaction better 
than operating cash flows. This is because 
accruals reduces the time and mismatch 
problems (mismatching) embodied in the 
use of short-term cash flows (Dechow, 
1994).  
Yet, the flexibility is always open in the 
implementation of Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP) that leads man-
agement to choose the accounting policies of 
the various policy options that exist. Thus, in 
turn, it also allows them to get for the flexi-
bility of the earnings management by the 
company management (Subramanyam , 
1996). In this case, Scott (2000) suggests 
that earnings management can make the 
companies efficient (increase in profit) and 
can be opportunistic. If earnings manage-
ment is opportunistic, the information may 
lead to profit and make the wrong invest-
ment decisions for investors. Therefore, it is 
imperative to see the factors affecting the 
profits of the company management. 
This study attempts to provide empirical 
evidence on the impact of Indonesia's corpo-
rate practice, ownership structure, and firm 
size on the magnitude of earnings manage-
ment by the manufacturing companies listed 
in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
It is also expected to contribute to the 
development of conceptual earnings man-
agement literature, by adding independent 
variable, namely the ownership (combined 
with a business group). This is considered 
important when concerning the condition of 
the stock ownership in Indonesia. They have 
been dominated by family ownership, and 
this is different from the structure of share 
ownership in the United States whose own-
ership is spread worldwide. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
It has been the fact that the research on cor-
porate governance is increasing rapidly 
along with the opening of large-scale finan-
cial scandals (e.g. Enron, Tyco, WorldCom 
and Global Crossing) involving accountants, 
one important element of good corporate 
governance. The scandals represent the 
negative consequences of weak governance 
system and seek to identify the determinants 
that can improve the implementation of cor-
porate governance. Iskandar and Chamlou 
(2000), for example, stated that the eco-
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nomic crisis in Southeast Asia and other 
countries occurs not only due to macroeco-
nomic factors but also weak corporate gov-
ernance in those countries, such as weak 
legality of accounting standards and finan-
cial inspection (auditing) that have not been 
established, capital markets that are still un-
der-regulated, weak supervision of commis-
sioners, and the neglect of the rights of mi-
norities. Such a condition also indicates that 
good corporate governance has not only a 
positive result for shareholders, but also for 
the wider community in the form of national 
economic growth.  
In the above circumstance, the various 
economic institutions and the financial 
world such as the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund are becoming inter-
ested in the enforcement of corporate gov-
ernance in recipient countries because they 
assume that corporate governance is an es-
sential part of an efficient market system. 
Good corporate governance development 
efforts aimed at encouraging the optimiza-
tion of the allocation or use of company re-
sources for growth and prosperity of the 
owner of the company intact.  
In this case, corporate governance is es-
sentially a matter of controlling the behavior 
of top corporate executives to protect the 
interests of company owners (shareholders). 
This problem arises because of the separa-
tion between ownership and company man-
agement. The owners of the company as 
suppliers of capital can delegate their author-
ity of the management of the company to 
professional managers. As a result, the au-
thority to use corporate resources is entirely 
in the hands of the executive. Shareholders 
expect management to act in a professional 
to manage the company. Any decision taken 
should be based on the interests of share-
holders and existing resources used solely 
for the sake of growth (value) of the firms. 
However, what often happens is that the 
decisions taken by management are not 
solely for the benefit of the company but 
also for the interests of executives. In fact, in 
many cases, decisions and actions taken 
have only often become the benefits but also 
harms for the corporate executives. In other 
words, management has an agenda which is 
different from the interests of the owners. 
The use of creative accounting, business 
failures, limited roles of auditors, the ab-
sence of a clear relationship between com-
pensation and the performance of the sys-
tem, emphasis on performance (accounting 
profit) at the expense of short-term long-
term economic profits, and so on (Keasey 
and Wright, 1997) are some examples of the 
behavior deviations manager. 
In general, corporate governance is the 
means, mechanisms, and structures that 
serve as control over self-serving behavior 
of managers (Short et al., 1999). The man-
agement of the companies that are open 
(transparent) and accountable can prevent 
the occurrence of self-serving behavior. As 
revealed by Keasey and Wright (1997) that 
the corporate governance is a key element 
that concern the enhancement of corporate 
performance via the supervision, or monitor-
ing, of management performance and ensur-
ing the accountability of management to 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
Thus, Good corporate governance can 
be defined as an interaction between struc-
tures and mechanisms which ensure control 
and accountability, but still encourage effi-
ciency and performance of the company (Sa-
lowe, 2002). Anderson et al (2002) also 
stated that the company controlled by the 
family has a structure that reduces the 
agency conflict between shareholders and 
creditors, which the lender assumes the 
ownership by the family better, protect the 
interests of creditors. Anderson & Reeb 
(2002) showed that minority shareholders 
would benefit from the presence of family 
ownership. Arifin (2003) found that the pub-
lic companies in Indonesia, family-
controlled financial institutions or state or 
agency problems are better than a public 
company controlled by or without the main 
controller.  
Family-controlled firms, a smaller 
agency problem is due to reduced conflicts 
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between principal and agent. If family own-
ership is more efficient, the family holdings 
in companies with high earnings manage-
ment which is opportunistic may be re-
stricted. However, the more efficient of the 
control of the family's ownership it likely 
does not apply in the conglomerate, as it is 
widely available in Indonesia. For the con-
glomerate, usually most of the property 
owner does not reside in one company, but 
scattered in various companies.  
If only a few property owners who are in 
companies that go public, so even if the 
company goes public, they are still a family 
controlled, but the opportunistic earnings 
management can be even higher. The possi-
bilities for companies that go public are only 
used as a means of collecting funds from the 
public for use by the company. This is evi-
dent from the results of research Kim & Yi 
(2004) who found that the magnitude of 
earnings management is higher for compa-
nies that have affiliate group than those that 
do not have group or no affiliation. This 
means that firms with business group affilia-
tion provides controlling shareholders more 
incentive and opportunity for earnings man-
agement. 
It is advisable that the company should 
be controlled by the family and not a corpo-
rate conglomerate that can limit opportunis-
tic earnings management (negatively re-
lated), but will drive earnings management 
that is efficient (positively related). Institu-
tional investors often referred to as sophisti-
cated investors and should be able to use the 
current period information in predicting fu-
ture earnings as compared to non-
institutional investors. Balsam et al (2002) 
found a negative relationship between dis-
cretionary accruals that are not expected to 
yield stocks around the announcement date, 
which is a negative relationship, varies de-
pending on the level of investor sophistica-
tion.  
The market reaction of the more sophis-
ticated investors precedes that of unsophisti-
cated investors. Jiambalvo et al (1996) found 
that the absolute value of discretionary ac-
cruals is negatively related to ownership of 
institutional investors. Mitra (2002), Koh 
(2003), and Midiastuty &. Machfoedz 
(2003) also found that the presence of high 
institutional ownership limits managers to 
manage earnings. However, Darmawati 
(2003) found no evidence of an association 
between earnings management and institu-
tional ownership. If earnings management is 
done efficiently, the high institutional own-
ership would likely improve the earnings 
management (positively related). On the 
contrary, if the management of the company 
profits are opportunists, the high institutional 
ownership will reduce earnings management 
(negatively related). 
 The larger the company, the better the 
information available to investors in making 
investment decisions with respect to the 
shares of the company. Albrecth & Richard-
son (1990) and Lee & Choi (2002) found 
that larger firms have less impetus to do 
profit smoothing than small firms because 
large firms are seen as more critical by out-
siders. Therefore, the expected size of the 
company can affect the amount of earnings 
management, in which when the of earnings 
management is opportunistic is higher, the 
company’s earning management is also bet-
ter (negatively related), but if the efficient 
management of the greater profit of the 
company size, the higher the earnings man-
agement is (positively related). 
Dechow et al (1996) in his research 
shows that companies manipulate earnings 
are more likely to have a board dominated 
by management and are more likely to have 
major directors who concurrently become 
commissioner. Chtourou et al (2001) and 
Wedari (2004) found that the independent 
board would restrict earnings management 
activities. However, Parulian (2004) found 
that the independent commissioner compa-
nies on the JSE are not found to significantly 
affect the management of corporate profits. 
Klein (2002) found that the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals is higher for firms 
that have audit committees composed of in-
dependent commissioners less than compa-
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nies that have audit committees composed of 
many independent commissioners. Wedari 
(2004) finds that discretionary accruals in 
companies that do not have audit committees 
significantly higher than the companies that 
have no audit committee.  
While Parulian (2004) concluded that 
audit committees have a significantly nega-
tive relationship with negative discretionary 
accruals, but not significantly associated 
with positive discretionary accruals. Other 
studies on audit committees indicate the ex-
istence of audit committees which are less 
effective as one of the practice of corporate 
governance in companies listed on the JSE. 
Mayangsari (2003) investigated the influ-
ence of the existence of an audit committee 
for the integrity of financial reporting (as 
measured by the index of conservatism). It 
showed that the existence of audit committee 
was negatively related to the integrity of fi-
nancial statements.  
Unlike Nuryanah (2004), she found that 
audit committee did not significantly affect 
the value of the company. A system of cor-
porate governance in companies believed to 
limit the opportunistic earnings manage-
ment. It is due to the fact that it is expected 
with higher audit quality, the higher the pro-
portion of independent board and audit 
committee of the less opportunistic earnings 
management (negatively related). However, 
if earnings management is efficient, it will 
be the opposite (positively related). 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The population consists of all the manufac-
turing companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange with total of 157 units. 
These were selected based on purposive 
sampling method, and 117 units of the com-
panies were taken as the sample, during 5 
years, from 2002 to 2007. 
These quantitative data were obtained 
from the capital market reference center, in 
the form of financial statements issued by 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange, 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory and 
Listing of Securities Exchange (DKE). In 
addition to determining whether the sample 
is a conglomerate company or not, it was 
determined through a survey of the literature 
books (such as Conglomeration Indonesia 
(2002) and Top Companies and Big Groups 
in Indonesia (2002). 
The multiple regression was used to ana-
lyze the influence of corporate governance 
practices, ownership, and firm size towards 
the magnitude of earnings management. The 
formulation of the multiple regression mod-
els is as the following: 
Y=α + β1NAA + β2PKK + β3PPI + β4NLP 
+ β5AUD + β6MDD + β7KAD + β8RTH + 
β9RPM + ε, (1) 
where: 
NAA = absolute value of discretionary ac-
cruals. It is because this study is the 
amount of earnings management 
(discretionary accruals), rather than 
the direction (positive or negative). 
PKK  = 1 if firms have high family owner-
ship (the proportion of family own-
ership> 50%) and they are not a 
conglomerate and 0 otherwise. 
PPI  = proportion of institutional investor 
ownership. 
NLP = Natural logarithm of market capi-
talization. 
AUD = If the companies audited by Big 4, 
they are given values 1 and 0 if oth-
erwise. 
MDD = proportion of independent board. 
KAD = If the company has an audit com-
mittee in compliance with BEI, it is 
given a value of 1 and 0 if other-
wise. 
RTH = Ratio of total debt to total assets. 




Total accruals (ACCR) is measured as the 
difference between net income before ex-
traordinary items and operating cash flow 
(ACCR = EARN - CFO). This is to decom-
pose total accruals into discretionary and 
non discretionary component of the formula-
tion used (Dechow et al, 2002). 
ISSN 2087-3735 Corporate Governance Practices,… (Hadi Sirat) 
150 
Family Shareholding 
The whole sample is classified into families 
of high ownership (the proportion of family 
ownership> 50%) and low family ownership 
(the proportion of family ownership <50%). 
After this, it created a dummy variable for 
family ownership, which is 1 if the company 
that has high family ownership and not a 
conglomerate and 0 otherwise. 
 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of 
shares by financial institutions such as insur-




Firm size is measured by natural logarithm 
of firm equity market value at the end of the 
year, the number of shares outstanding at 
year end are multiplied by the price of the 
stock market by year end. 
 
Corporate Governance Practices 
This study used three proxies of corporate 
governance practices such as (1) Firm Size, 
used to measure the quality audit, which the 
companies are audited by Big 4 (public ac-
countant office or large KAP) then it is he 
high-quality audits and if audited by non Big 
4 (small KAP), it is the low audit quality, (2) 
The proportion of independent board is cal-
culated by dividing the number of independ-
ent board members to total board. Informa-
tion on the number of independent commis-
sioners can be obtained from the annual re-
ports of each company, Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory, and also of the an-
nouncement issued by the JSE, and (3) The 
existence of the Audit Committee, which is 
to determine whether the company has an 
audit committee or not will be checked in 
The annual report of each company and an-
nouncements issued by Indonesia stock ex-
change. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Testing the hypothesis in the study is valid 
when based on valid data or information, 
and the information is also valid if obtained 
from the data quality. Data contain outliers if 
the data are biased and not qualified. The 
test to determine whether there is data out-
lier in this study, with methods of descrip-
tive statistics (Descriptive Statistics). The 
results showed that all research variable 
mean values were greater than the standard 
deviation, so that all variables contain no 
data outliers (Table 1). Therefore, all vari-
ables used in this study were analyzed to 
prove the hypothesis is feasible. 
It showed that the average discretionary 
accrual is 0.0462 and the standard deviation 
is 0.0364. This suggests that earnings man-
agement among firms that do the variations 
is still quite high. Institutional ownership is 
relatively small at only 2.63%. Only 21.42% 
of the sample firms have a high family own-
ership and not a corporate conglomerate. 
Most of the sample firms (89.27%) were 
audited by Big 4. Family shareholding 
(PKK), proportion of institutional investor 
ownership (PPI), and KAP Audit by Big 4 
(AUD) significantly correlated with the 
magnitude of earnings management (NAA).  
Family shareholding (PKK) and the pro-
portion of institutional investor ownership 
(PPI) are negatively correlated. This is be-
cause the measurement of family sharehold-
ing (PKK) uses a dummy variable where 1 
for firms with high family ownership and is 
not a conglomerate and the public if the 
conglomerate has a size larger than the com-
pany's non-conglomerate firms.  
The proportion of institutional investor 
ownership (PPI) and the Natural Logarithm 
of Market Capitalization (NLP) were posi-
tively correlated, where it shows a lot more 
institutional investors to invest in large com-
panies than in small firms. Audit by Big 4 
Firm (AUD) and the proportion of inde-
pendent board (MDD) were positively corre-
lated; meaning that companies have an audit 
committee also have a high proportion of 
independent commissioners. Natural loga-
rithm of market capitalization (NLP) and 
KAP Audit by Big 4 (AUD) are positively 
correlated, meaning that large enterprises are 
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more frequently used than KAP KAP Non 
Big 4 Big 4. 
The test results with the regression 
model (Table 2) shows as the following. 
1. At a significance level of 5% on average 
earnings in the company's management with 
high family ownership (PKK) and not a 
conglomeration of companies which is sig-
nificantly higher than average earnings in 
the management of other companies , with 
p-value 0.037;  
2. The proportion of institutional investor 
ownership (PPI) negatively affect the magni-
tude of earnings management with a p-value 
of -0.063,  
3. NLP has a positive influence on earnings 
management, but no significant influence on 
the amount of earnings management (NAA), 
with p-value 0.246. These results are consis-
tent with the results of the study Darmawati 
(2003) who also found no evidence of a sig-
nificant relationship between earnings man-
agement with institutional ownership,  
4. Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
(NLP) has a significant negative impact on 
earnings management, with a p-value -0.017. 
This means that the larger the company will 
be smaller profits made by company man-
agement. These results are consistent with 
the findings of Lee & Chai (2002), in which 
small firms are more likely to manage earn-




Variabel Mean Std. Deviation N 
NAA 4.313 0.642 117 
PKK 4.402 0.542 117 
PPI 4.467 0.562 117 
NLP 4.415 0.673 117 
AUD 4.062 0.759 117 
PDK 3.567 0.533 117 
KAD 3.628 0.519 117 
TRH 4.326 0.674 117 
PPJ 3.429 0.528 117 
 
Table 2 
Results of Testing by Multiple Regression Model 
 
Independent Variabel Coefisient of Regression T-test Statistics 
Sig. 
Partial 
Constant 1.141 5.644 0.074 
PKK 0.462 6.436 0.037 
PPI -0.473 1.111 -0.063 
NLP -0.415 2.196 -0.017 
AUD 0.181 3.409 0.524 
PDK 0.290 4.053 0.309 
KAD -0.257 2.318 -0.204 
RTH 0.364 4.637 0.104 
PPJ 0.403 3.032 0.542 
     Source: Data processed 
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5. Audit by Big 4 Firm (AUD) has a nega-
tive effect on earnings management, but no 
significant effect on the management earn-
ings, with a p-value 0.524; 
6. The proportion of the board of commis-
sioners (PDK) and do not have a significant 
positive influence on earnings management, 
with a p-value 0.309; 
7. Audit by Big 4 Firm (ADK) has a nega-
tive effect and no significant of earnings 
management, with a p-value -0.204, and; 
8. The variable ratio control total debt to 
total assets (RTH) has no significant positive 
effect on earnings management with a p-
value 0.104. The test results are consistent 
with the debt covenant hypothesis. While 
sales growth variables (RPM) have negative 
but not significant effect with p-value 0.542. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
Company size variables consistently had a 
significant negative effect on the amount of 
earnings management by the company, 
meaning the larger the size, the smaller the 
amount the management company's profits. 
In addition, the average earnings manage-
ment in companies with high family owner-
ship and not a conglomerate, they are sig-
nificantly higher than average earnings in 
the management of other companies. 
It is suggested that researcher should 
conduct research focused on developing the 
model of measurement in earning manage-
ment. It should be done more accurately 
such doing per industry. So, the industry 
characteristics which are different may in-
fluence earning management and this should 
be included in the research model. By doing 
so, it can identify the difference of manage-
ment of earnings in every industry. 
Developing instrument of measurement for 
calculating the index of corporate govern-
ance of public companies in Indonesia. 
Doing research on the effect of independent 
board proportion and the existence of audit 
committee towards the earning management 
for the longer period. 
Further research also identify which ac-
counts the companies often do the earning 
management. Thus, it can also provide rec-
ommendation which is more specific to-
wards standard setter for adding disclosures 
and towards investors for paying more atten-
tion to those accounts. 
This study found evidence that earnings 
management in family-controlled company 
and not a corporate conglomerate is higher 
than earnings management in other compa-
nies. This can be indicative of earnings man-
agement taken by family-controlled com-
pany and not a conglomerate is more effi-
cient than the other companies. Looking at 
the fact that the numbers of public compa-
nies are conglomerates, this study can be the 
input to the regulator to supervise the com-
pany's more on conglomerates, whose own-
ership is concentrated in one or a few par-
ties. 
Company size was proven to have sig-
nificant negative effects of the magnitude of 
earnings management, indicating that the 
smaller the company the greater the earnings 
management is carried out. This could indi-
cate that earnings management do small 
firms are not efficient. Therefore, the smaller 
the size of a company, the more control 
needs to be done by the regulators of small 
companies, without the supervision of the 
company's light great companies. Since there 
is a possibility, not all larger companies are 
increasingly to open opportunistic earnings 
management for earnings management in 
large companies that have been planned 
more than just using the accrual policy, mak-
ing it more difficult to detect. 
Quality audit, which using KAP size, the 
main test is shown to have significant influ-
ence on earnings management practices that 
are carried out by the management. Most of 
the public have the perception that large-
scale KAPs can provide high quality audit. 
The results in this study can be stated that 
the public perception is less precise, because 
the companies which are audited by big 
profits are not shown to limit the manage-
ment of the company. 
A high proportion of independent com-
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missioners and the existence of audit com-
mittees are not shown to limit the profits of 
the company management. There are several 
possible explanations for this. First, the ap-
pointment of an independent commissioner 
and the company's audit committee may 
only be carried out for regulatory compli-
ance but are not intended to enforce good 
corporate governance (GCG) in the com-
pany.  
Second, the minimum requirement of an 
independent board of 30% may not be high 
enough to cause the independent commis-
sioner to dominate the measures taken by the 
board of commissioners. When the inde-
pendent commissioner is a party to the ma-
jority that is > 50%, it may be more effective 
in carrying out the monitoring role within 
the company. But, if the appointment has not 
been based on the needs (needs) of the com-
pany but was limited to the fulfillment of 
regulations, then the proportion of the board 
of commissioners may not need to be cop-
ied, fixed in accordance with existing regu-
lations (at least 30%), and viewed the effec-
tiveness of the board and audit committee is 
also in a longer period of time. 
In order for the appointment of an inde-
pendent commissioner and the company's 
audit committee is not limited to compliance 
with any regulation, the regulators need to 
think of ways to better disseminate the need 
for enforcement of good corporate govern-
ance. Suppose, as a survey conducted by the 
GCG and to reward companies with good 
corporate governance best. The regulator 
may also publish writings that show evi-
dence that companies implementing GCG 
obtain a positive reaction from the market, 
so it can grow in the company that needs to 
implement good corporate governance. In 
addition, for companies those have not 
raised an independent commissioner and in 
compliance with audit committees, they may 
also be subject to strict sanctions. 
The present study also found that firm 
size negatively affects the magnitude of 
earnings management. This means that the 
smaller the company, the greater the earn-
ings management. If the management of op-
portunistic profits is made, the greater the 
earnings management does not reflect the 
actual performance of the company. This 
needs to be a concern of investors in making 
investment decisions. Therefore, for inves-
tors, especially individual investors who are 
naive, probably, are better to buy stocks or 
invest in larger companies. 
The presence of opportunistic earnings 
management can benefit the company in the 
short term, but this led to a loss on the inves-
tor. If the investor later realized that the 
company doing the opportunistic earnings 
management and lead investor is taking the 
wrong decision, the investors will lose con-
fidence in the company and will appear in 
the company's negative image. Conse-
quently, in the long run, investors are no 
longer interested in buying shares of the 
company and its share price will decline. 
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